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The purpose of this descriptive study was to explore the relationship between a
carrier's service/capacity share and passenger share to determine the presence of the scurve. The author is unaware of a current, accepted analysis for understanding the scurve with any degree of reliability. Regression analysis was used to correlate
service/capacity share against passenger share for domestic, United States air carriers.
Carrier ranking was then added as a predicting variable to gain further insight into the
correlation between service share and passenger share. It is anticipated that this study
will be beneficial to airline network planners in their analysis of city pair, service share,
and fleet choices.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Planners and Schedulers in the airline industry often analyze the effect of fleet
assignment and route consolidation or expansion as they strive to optimize schedule
effectiveness and aircraft utilization. While there are a number of concessions made for
maintenance, crew schedules, slots, gates and regulatory restrictions, the goal is always to
maximize revenue on the network.
The flying public plays a key role in this analysis, as it is their decision regarding
which carrier to fly that affects the goal of an airline to maximize revenue. There is
considerable history in the use of Quality Service Indexes (path quality: nonstop, onestop, two-stop, etc. service) and service offerings (frequent flyer programs, flight timing
and number of departures, airline image, etc.) to predict a consumer's choice among
carriers. However, the author is unaware of any current, accepted s-curve methodology
for predicting or measuring the relationship between service at a city and the resulting
capacity share. With an understanding of s-curve characteristics in forecasting capacity
share as a result of fleet and departure presence in a city, analysts would have an
additional evaluation tool, enabling them to make more informed decisions regarding
network strategy.
Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this study was to test the correlation between service
characteristics and capacity share in an attempt to better understand s-curve effects when
making airline network planning choices. This study is based on regression analysis and
published Department of Transportation annual results. For the purpose of this study,
carriers are defined as domestic, United States, airlines operating jet or propeller aircraft.
1

2
Customers and passengers refer to those individuals predisposed to choosing air travel as
the preferred form of transportation. S-curve describes the phenomenon when a
transportation provider receives either greater or less than their capacity share in a market
as a result of a service characteristic.
Review of Related Literature
Patterns of social and economic activities influence the need for transportation.
Understanding the interaction of these activities and their resulting behaviors render a
framework for the delivery of transportation systems and facilities. Transportation
demand analysis provides the mechanism for modeling, understanding, and forecasting
the volumes of traffic that require a transportation infrastructure. A meaningful measure
of the relationship between traffic volumes and transportation system characteristics, as
influenced by socioeconomic factors, is essential in designing economically feasible
transportation systems (Kanafani, 1983).
Consumer demand is the relationship between traffic volumes and transportation
cost characteristics. Supply is the way in which transportation providers respond to this
demand. The demand models are designed to explain how the variables contributing to
demand interact and forecast future traffic volumes (Kanafani, 1983). Forecasters use
these models to study the impact and recommend action regarding the demand and
supply environments. As socioeconomic environments and traffic volumes alter, the
scrutiny and adaptation of transportation models is required to capture dynamics affecting
transportation systems (Kanafani, 1983).
The formal study of transportation demand analysis began as early as the middle
nineteenth century. During this period, studies focused on the relationship between the
geography of resources and the shape of transportation networks. Models followed with
an analysis of migration patterns and the integration of different modes of travel to meet
consumer demand. Analysts in the early twentieth century focused on urban travel
activities and behavioral influences. The quantification of human attitudes, psychological
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characteristics, and the incorporation of random elements constitute some of the recent
advances in transportation demand analysis (Kanafani, 1983).
Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938, establishing the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) as the regulatory authority governing domestic and interstate
passenger operations. Its objective was to curb the industry's huge financial losses by
protecting airlines from excess competition and guaranteeing service to travelers (Dana &
Schmitt, 1995). The CAB was given authority over all pricing and route decisions,
mergers, acquisitions, and interline agreements (Dana & Schmitt, 1995).
The CAB created a route system independent of airline "network" considerations.
Most of the flight segments were insulated and a point to point service network was
established. An 80% rule applied to the airlines, where 80% of the flights had to be
nonstop and 80% of the passengers needed to originate or terminate on the offered route.
Airlines did not have an incentive to consider non-stop versus a multiple stop network
(Ippolito, 1981). "Faced with suppressed routing and pricing options, the airlines
competed on services such as meals, movies, and seating comfort" (Kou, 1995, p. 3).
At this time, analysts concentrated on air travel versus other modes of
transportation. Early studies focused on evaluating when travelers and commodities
progressed from sea to land to air transportation. It was found that as income increased,
the value of an individual's time increased (Russon & HoUingshead, 1989). As the value
of time and willingness to pay increased, the progression from sea to land to air travel
occurred. Therefore, as air travel became more economical in total travel cost, it replaced
automobile travel (Russon & HoUingshead, 1989).
Total travel cost was identified as the out-of-pocket cost of transport plus the
value travelers place on their personal travel time, where personal travel time is the
interval between departure from home or office until arrival at a final destination
(Gronau, 1970). In the case of air transport, this includes waiting time until the next
flight, origin and transport time to airport, origin terminal processing time, flying time,
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waiting at intermediate stops, baggage claim, and destination local transport time (Russon
& HoUingshead, 1989).
When Hansen (1988) performed his analysis of aircraft operating data and major
airlines, he found that the airlines' use of a simple linear model was extremely accurate in
identifying travel time for aircraft types. The only differences resulted between non-stop
and one-stop activity and whether this one-stop activity resulted in a "fixed time
component once (direct service) or twice (hubbed service)" (Hansen, 1988, p. 87). As
intermediate stops increase the total travel time of air transport to the time required for
driving, "the number of enplaned passengers would diminish to zero irrespective of
population, income, or flight frequency" (Russon & HoUingshead, 1989, p. 302).
Russon and HoUingshead (1989) continued this analysis to include price and fare
elements in the total travel cost. They found that even with a high amount of time
efficiency, there was a fare threshold where passengers would no longer rule out
competing modes of travel. They reported that "as air travel becomes more economical,
it will be substituted for automobile travel." (Russon & Hallingshead, 1989, p. 300).
The next logical step in the air transport analysis included a consideration of
passenger income driving airline demand. Hansen (1988) hypothesized that increased
income levels drove increased demand for leisure travel. He believed this would cause
additional flight frequencies to be added, decreasing the time variable in total travel cost,
and thereby continuing to increase the number of passengers seeking to travel by air.
Douglas and Miller (1974) identified two additional components of total travel
time. The first component is "frequency delay" or the time between when a passenger
wishes to travel and the actual departure time. The second component, "scholastic
delay," results from the possibility that the preferred flight is sold out. Since a passenger
only recognizes that a flight is not available, the demand model variable becomes the sum
of the delay times, known as schedule delay (Douglas & Miller, 1974).
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From an airline perspective, this issue came down to flight frequency and average
load factor. "The greater the flight frequency, the shorter the average waiting time
between flights, and the lower the average load factor, the less likely any given flight will
be sold out" (Abrahams, 1983, p. 385). It was at this time when the s-curve phenomenon
was first documented. Airline analysts found examples where added capacity resulted in
a disproportionate share of the available market traffic (Kou, 1995). "In 1975, the CAB
described the 'so-called s-curve theory' as 'the claim that increases (or reduction) of
marginal flights (those generating revenues covering out-of-pocket, but not fully
allocated costs) result in a greater-than-proportional gain (or loss) of market share"
(O'Connor, 1975, p. 89).
Studies by Fruhan (1972) supported this theory. He found "that for a carrier to
increase (or maintain) its market share on the particular route it flies, the carrier must
expand its seat capacity faster than (or at least as fast as) its competitors" (p. 132). The
result was a fierce rivalry throughout the industry as airlines purchased aircraft to add
frequency in an effort to capture that additional market share (Kou, 1995).
Analysts later learned that the market share advantage of capacity on highly
competitive markets was short-term and often resulted in over-scheduling (O'Connor,
1989). There is a point where increased enplaned passengers will increase at a
decreasing rate with flight frequency, until there is no longer productivity in adding an
additional flight (Russon & HoUingshead, 1989).
Airlines also spent a considerable amount of money in competition over meals,
movies, and the size and comfort of aircraft (Dana & Schmitt, 1995). Carriers began to
show weakened earnings and balance sheets (Kou, 1995). During the 1970's, the
industry's financial outlook worsened with a drop in consumer demand and the rise of
fuel and labor costs. To address this issue, the CAB declared a policy of refusing to grant
new route applications and allowing carriers to cooperatively reduce capacity in highdensity markets (Kou, 1995). The result was approved fare increases with reduction of
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service on popular routes. Consumers became extremely critical of regulation in the
airline industry (Kou, 1995).
In 1976, the Kennedy Report concluded that
deregulation would allow pricing flexibility, which would stimulate new and
innovative offerings; allow passengers the range of price and service options
dictated by consumer demand; enhance carrier productivity and efficiency; and
increase industry health (Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures:
Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice of the
Judiciary Committee, 1976).
A trial period of liberalized entry and pricing mechanisms resulted in financial success,
new demand, and lower fares (Kou, 1995).
In October 1978, President Carter signed the Airline Deregulation Act (Kou,
1995). Following deregulation, low-cost entrants challenged incumbents with low fares.
The 1979 fuel crisis, the early 1980's recession, the 1981 air traffic controllers' strike,
and intense price competition produced the worst financial losses in aviation history.
More than 150 carriers declared bankruptcy while the average cost of an airline seat
continued to decline (Kou, 1995). The economic situation thwarted customer traffic,
causing airline seats to fly empty. It became clear that the longstanding presumption that
adding flight frequency, and additional seats, in an effort to capture market share, did not
work in the post regulatory environment (Ippolito, 1981).
Since seat inventory could not be stored for later use, carriers were losing both the
value of the seat and the cost to fly the seat (Bamber, 1997). Airlines recognized that to
stay in business, they needed to find ways to attract customers independent of lowering
prices (Kou, 1995). This reaction to deregulation was far different from economists'
original predictions (Peterpaul, 1993).
The value of filling airplane seats caused significant changes in airline marketing
and scheduling practices. Passenger preference was hypothesized to be dependent upon
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schedule convenience, fare, flight frequency, delay due to unavailability, and connection
delays. Other factors thought to affect the profitability of routes were the population and
per capita income at origin and destination points (Russon & HoUingshead, 1989).
An emphasis on quality service variables as they affect the number of enplaned
passengers also became a factor in service offerings (Russon & HoUingshead, 1989).
Non-stop flight frequencies with large and small aircraft and connecting flight
frequencies were hypothesized to have different impacts on the number of enplaned
passengers (Russon & HoUingshead, 1989). Differences in capacity, comfort, price and
speed were all thought to be reasons a consumer would first choose a nonstop route in a
large aircraft. Due to the time impact on total travel cost, connecting flights were
thought to have a different (negative) impact on consumer choice, providing increased
transit time, layovers, and a much lower driving/flying time differential (Russon &
HoUingshead, 1989).
While most travelers would prefer nonstop service, the number of city-pair
markets that can sustain nonstop service is quite small. In order to maximize revenue,
major airlines abandoned point to point scheduling in favor of hub and spoke networks.
A schedule that provides connections to large numbers of city-pairs allowed hub
operators to achieve and maintain a higher load factor (percentage of occupied seats) than
it would if each route were operated as a separate entity (Bamber, 1997). The hub and
spoke network allowed airlines to provide more service offerings (origins and
destinations) and make the best use of airplanes, air and ground crews, and gates.
Consequently, cost per passenger could be reduced (Jeng, 1988).
Airlines began to consolidate activities over hub operations in an effort to increase
load factors on flights in and out of the hub airport (Peterpaul, 1993). While this would
seem to indicate that nonstop flight operations were nearly abandoned, the truth was that
nonstop flight activity rose 4% from 1978 to 1983 (Civil Aeronautics Board, 1984). In
fact, "the percentage of 145 cities connected with large, medium, and small cities (by
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FAA's definition) by nonstop flights was 31%, 14%, and 5% for 1977. They increased to
34%, 17%, and 6% for 1984" (Ghafouri-Barzand, 1986, p. 12).
While airlines began to schedule hub and spoke systems in an effort to decrease
the cost per passenger, airlines were still aware of the preference of passengers for nonstop to connecting flights (Peterpaul, 1993). Next to non-stop service, Peterpaul (1993)
found that there was a preference among consumers for direct flights, followed by
connecting to another flight on the same airline. A direct flight provides the convenience
that a passenger does not need to deplane prior to the next flight segment and connecting
on the same airline allows a passenger to transfer to another flight within the same
terminal area. The passenger views these possibilities as decreased travel
inconveniences, and decreased concern over baggage mishandling (Peterpaul, 1993).
As a function of service quality, Hansen (1988) described an s-curve effect for
direct service at a market share ratio of 2.45 to 1. A clear advantage for airlines offering
direct service. He also found a 2.19 to 1 market share ratio for increased frequencies.
His studies concluded that a minimum frequency is more important than the maximum,
but that having the maximum frequency did provide more market share as consumers in a
hubbed service "can diminish layover times and thereby improve service quality"
(Hansen, 1988, p. 91).
Airlines strove to offer a service advantage by providing direct and on-line flight
connections. This strategy also served to maximize the amount of traffic flowing over
the hub (Ghobrial & Kanafani, 1995). By 1990, 52% of passengers on trips over 1,500
miles changed planes to complete their flight, this rose from 42% in 1978. Over the same
time period, "the percentage of all trips that included a change of airline fell from 11.2%
in 1978 to 1.2% in 1990" (Dana & Schmitt, 1995, p. 5).
These studies also resulted in a competitive mindset for short and medium haul
feeder markets. The strategy included providing the most frequency into the hub, thereby
making it harder for a competitor to route traffic away from a hub and spoke system
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(Ghobrial & Kanafani, 1995). This created a new issue for airlines who had been
focusing on purchasing numerous large aircraft to meet passenger service quality
requirements. When an airline operates with more frequencies, unless the market size
continues to increase, the average size of the required aircraft gets smaller. However, the
conduit routes continued to create a need for larger aircraft (Ghobrial & Kanafani, 1995).
The fare equation in total travel cost also began to show deregulation variance.
Travelers appeared to react to fares charged for air travel; showing elasticity in a large
number of city-pairs (Abrahams, 1983). An econometric analysis performed by Ghobrial
and Kanafani (1995) found that when comparing flight frequency during peak periods,
aircraft size, and travel times, "the demand was elastic with respect to airfare and was
highly dependent on flight schedule and travel time (Ghobrial & Kanafani, 1995). Longhaul and vacation travelers showed more elasticity than short-haul and business traffic.
However, there was a threshold for short-haul routes when the cost of airline travel
approached the total travel cost for driving. At this point, levels of traffic in both the
business and vacation segments declined (Abrahams, 1983).
Ghobrial and Kanafani (1995) showed that airfare was influenced by market
concentration and level of service. Markets served predominately by a single carrier
tended to have higher fares. However, they also depended upon whether the predominant
trip purpose was business or non-business, and the capacity constraints of the utilized
airports (Ghobrial & Kanafani, 1995). Airlines recognized that business travelers were
willing to pay for frequent departures and last minute seat availability (Abrahams, 1983).
"Service characteristics for this customer segment include flight schedule and load factor
rather than amenities such as food and drinks. Other segments of the public prefer a
lower fare, even though this meant a reduction in the quality of service" (O'Connor,
1989, p. 91). The overall result was that in 1986, 90% of all airline passengers flew at a
fare discount averaging 61% (Gourdin, 1988).

Due to runway lengths, gate space, airport improvement charges, and allowed
hours of operation, airline analysts became interested in what factors caused a passenger
to choose one airport over the other. Airports farther away from the main population can
produce service improvements due to a decrease in the amount of airspace congestion
and a lower operating cost to the airline, thereby reducing the overall fare to consumers
(Ashford & Benchemam (1987).
Elasticity demand models performed by Ashford and Benchemam (1987) showed
that airport choice was not equally responsive to changes in access time, flight frequency
and airfare. The accessibility variable was more important than flight frequency for all
passengers. The fare variable was found only to be significant for leisure and domestic
passengers. Therefore, leisure and domestic passengers could be attracted to one airport
or another by a lower fare, but business travelers were much more influenced by changes
in flight frequency (Asheford & Benchemam, 1987).
Russon and HoUingshead (1989) expanded this theory to include the use of small
aircraft as a service variable. They found that for service to cities with multiple airports,
other quality of service characteristics needed to improve for passengers to choose an
airport with airlines utilizing smaller aircraft. Similarly, they found that the frequency,
delay, and overall transport time needed to be adjusted for price and discomfort variables,
otherwise, passengers would not choose to fly from the secondary airport.
Airlines could not cost effectively provide high levels of customer service while
meeting the consumer demand for increased frequency, lower overall travel times, and
lower fares. It became unreasonable for travelers to expect a great deal of personal
service, fancy food, or spacious seating at low rates. Airlines increased focus on the first
and business class products to meet needs in this segment of the market (Conine, 1987).
It was at this point that airlines recognized that consumers choose airlines based
on their perceived level of overall service (Ashford & Benchemam, 1987).
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O'Connor (1989) found that if
there are two airlines in the market and one has 60 percent of the capacity,
prospective passengers will tend to think first of this dominant carrier when they
decide to reserve space on a flight. They will also be more likely to find the most
desirable departure time and available space on that carrier. Thus, the airline with
60 percent of the total capacity will win more than 60 percent of the traffic (p. 8889).
Beginning in the mid-1990s, United States and European carriers adopted a
predominant competitive strategy of adding frequencies and retaining a passenger
throughout the entire trip (Bamber, 1997). Alliances with foreign carriers allowed an
airline to develop a worldwide network. Efficiency was obtained because there were
very few city-pairs in the world which generated enough passengers to support nonstop
services. Carriers explored connections with alliance partners to increase the share of
traffic between partner carriers. While there was the potential to increase market share,
the advantages of joint mileage programs, handling each other's flights, and sharing
terminal and sales environments was believed to provide substantial savings for both
carriers (Bamber, 1997).
There has also been a trend towards teaming up with feeder airlines specializing
in the utilization of 19 to 72 seat aircraft. In some cases, the hub carrier may have a
partial or complete financial holding in the feeder carrier. Traditionally, the partnership
involves the feeder carrier adopting the hub carrier's flight designator, rescheduling its
flights to connect into the hub carrier's banks, and implementing marketing programs to
include through check-in, joint use of lounges, and mileage credits. In most cases, the
smaller aircraft are repainted in the larger carrier's colors and employees will wear the
larger carrier's uniform. The result is to give breadth to an airline by providing access to
smaller regional markets and increase overall load factor by bringing more passengers
through a hub carrier's system (Bamber, 1997).

The evolving worldwide trend towards a less regulated environment has created
renewed interest in the applicability of the s-curve. As governments review the
competitive environment for carriers to enter new markets and new carriers to make an
impact on operating systems, the s-curve has provided some insight for decision makers
on this subject.
The October 2000 decision by Mexico's Federal Competition Commission
regarding the separate public sale of Aeromexico and Mexicana cites a competitive
response deficiency in the s-curve. In a statement of points presented by the
Commission, it assumed the effect of the s-curve was limited to flow versus local
markets. In part, the commission used this argument to defend the potential for
Aeromexico and Mexicana to successfully coexist with headquarters operations at
Mexico City Airport (Federal Competition Commission, 2000).
At nearly the same time, the U.S. Department of Transportation began an
investigation into predatory practices in the commercial aviation industry. In the federal
notice dedicated to this investigation, the s-curve was described as existing in "local
markets served by more than one carrier, where the major carrier's higher frequency
attracts a greater share of the local traffic than that carrier would otherwise carry"
(Hunnicutt, 1998). The Boyd Group/ASRC, Inc. (1998) identified the difficulty carriers
have entering new markets as a result of the effects of the s-curve. They noted that "very
rarely does a new carrier have capacity available to establish itself in a position of
strength in a market large enough to support the service" (p. 11).
Finally, when the Canadian Government recommended changes to its aviation
policy, general understandings of the s-curve were used to describe concern for predatory
practices. Based on these concerns, it was recommended that the Governor-in-Council
be given the authority to issue cease and desist orders to air carriers (von Finckenstein,
1999).

Models for describing the behavior of individuals in choice situations have wide
applicability for established and new airlines, governments, and regulatory environments.
Bruzelius and Magnus (1981) cite the benefits of economic modeling to "study the effect
on traffic flow of some hypothetical or expected change in the cost of transportation from
one city to another when more than one alternative is open to the traveler." Ghobrial and
Kanafani (1995) support this conclusion, adding that modeling needs to include more
quality of service variables.
Understanding the forces that affect demand for carrier service is critical to
effective carrier decisions on operating, pricing, yield management, and
marketing/promotional strategies. Measuring the factors affecting air traffic
growth at the market level is critical to effective decisions on route structure,
expansion to new markets, fleet size and composition, and the level of carrier
service by origin market and city pair (Proussaloglou, 1994, p. 2).
Statement of the Hypothesis
Since the early 1970's, airline analysts have speculated that an s-curve
phenomena exists; so that as a carrier increases service/capacity on an origin and
destination or in a city, that carrier will receive a passenger/revenue share greater than its
capacity share. The researcher is unaware of any current, accepted methodology, for
measuring this effect with any degree of reliability. Therefore, the researcher asked the
following questions. "Does the s-curve exist?" If so, "Is the s-curve a route
phenomenon or a city phenomenon?" And, "Do rankings for service levels affect the scurve?"

CHAPTER II
METHOD
Samples
The samples for this study were composed of origin and destination (O&D)
operations in the United States (U.S.) as operated by U.S. air carriers for the 1995 and
1996 calendar years. Four quarters worth of data were evaluated for the two years
selected. While this constitutes an enormous amount of raw data, the sample selection
represents 10% of the carrier operations in the United States.
The data reported to the US Department of Transportation (DOT), Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, is based on an industry comprised of 260 U.S. airlines and 215
foreign reporting airlines. The Office of Airline Information (OAT) compiles 12,000
paper financial reports and 2,100 computer disks/tapes of financial and market/traffic
statistics annually to prepare the DOT data. The information is currently gathered from
passenger tickets collected at the airport gate using a sample of approximately 10 percent
of domestic and international air travel trips on U.S. carriers. For example, of the nearly
35 million tickets sold each quarter, approximately 2.5 million records, both paper and
computer, are generated by the airlines, compiled, and sent to the department's Bureau of
Transportation Statistics for review.
Instrument
The samples for this study were obtained through the O&D Plus Database as
published by Data Base Products, Inc. The information for this database is derived from
the comprehensive financial and market/traffic statistical economic data reported from
the air transportation industry via a quarterly survey of airline passenger traffic. This
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data is then published by the U.S. Department of Transportation's Office of Airline
Information.
The O&D data provided includes the point of origin, the air carrier of each flight
segment, the fare basis code (i.e., first class, coach, and discount coach fares), stopover
points, the destination, the number of passengers, and the actual airfare. The DOT
requires a 95% accuracy rate on this data from the air carriers. The information is used
by the government to analyze airline competition, select and approve air carriers for
international routes, monitor airfares, and make decisions on the distribution of grants to
airports. In addition, this data is used by airlines and aircraft manufacturers in the
industry to make route, fleet, and demand decisions.
In 1997, an audit was conducted by the Inspector General which found that 69%
of the 8,894 city-pairs reviewed did not meet the 95% accuracy criteria sought by the
department (Office of the Inspector General, 1998). For example, in 643 flight
segments, the O&D passenger counts were misreported in a range extending from 31% to
40%. While the Inspector General found the data collection system obsolete and the data
collected unreliable, this is the only data currently available to analyze large scale O&D
traffic in the U.S. airport system.
Design
The research method used in this study was Correlational, as outlined in the
textbook Educational Research, by Gay (1992). This method of research was chosen
because it was necessary to establish whether or not a relationship exists between service
variables and the resulting market/passenger share in order to determine if an s-curve
exists. The critical variables that were controlled include the resulting market share,
whereas uncontrolled variables were cities of origin, route O&D's, connections,
nonstops, the weighting of data points by size, carrier dominance in the market, low cost
carriers, and total passengers.
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Procedure
Industry speculation has been that as a carrier increases its service/capacity share
on a route or at a city, that carrier will receive a passenger/revenue share greater than its

>

are

c

capacity share. Figure 1 depicts the theoretical s-curve which represents this theory.
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Figure 1. Theoretical S-Curve. Percentage of Market Share by Service Share.

In order to identify the existence and shape of the s-curve, O&D data for the years
1995 and 1996 was analyzed with the least squares regression model to determine the line
fitted to the data. Regression analysis allows us to determine which line best fits or
models the data (Jaisingh, 2000).
This regression model was chosen because our hypothesis assumes there is a
relationship between the values of X and Y. The least-square criterion is described by
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1976, pp. 6-10) as
minimizing the total spread of y values from the line; creating the line of best fit.
The linear equation is as follows:

Y = a + bX,

Y is the dependent variable and X the independent variable. Since we wish to
minimize the vertical sum of the squared deviations from the fitted line, the
equation is restated as:

Minimizeyj

Yl-Yl

1=1

Y, =a + bX,

is the fitted value of Y corresponding to a particular observation X,, and N is the
number of observations.
The least-squared slope estimate is determined as:

The least-squares intercept can be obtained through:

A = Y-bX

The values for X and Y are the means for X and Y, derived from:

X =^ N

and

Y=-^N
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Following these computations, an Analysis of the Variance (ANOVA) must be performed
to determine if the line produced is actually a good fit. This means that the data plotted
on the scatter plot has a small deviation, as compared to the total spread of data points, to
the line (Gonick & Smith, 1993).
The squared correlation of this data is defined as:

1,(1-yf
The closer R2 is to 1, the tighter the fit of the curve (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, p. 35).
R2 values close to 1 imply that the model is explaining most of the
variation in the dependent variable and may be a very useful model. R values
close to 0 imply that the model is explaining little of the variation in the
dependent variable and may not be a useful model (Jaisingh, 2000, p. 91).
R2 =1 corresponds to a perfect fit of the dependent variable. Therefore, if
an R2 is described as .822, 82% of the variation is explained by the X variable and
the other 18% is error. A negative R indicates that the X variable is negatively
related to Y (Gonick & Smith, 1993, p. 195-196).
The second method used to test the validity of the linear regression model is
testing of the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis will be accepted if the slope of the
regression line is 0. By rejecting the null hypothesis, we accept that the alternative
hypothesis is accepted, until additional testing is performed (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1976).
The third procedure for testing the regression equation includes testing the
existence of a linear relationship between X and Y. A strong statistical relationship
between X and Y will result in a large ration of explained to unexplained variance
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1976). In testing the null hypothesis, a high value for the F
statistic is rationale for rejecting the null hypothesis. "If the value is close to 0, it must be

concluded that the explanatory variables do little to explain the variation of Y about its
mean" (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1976, p. 60).

CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS
In testing the hypothesis for the existence of the s-curve, the first step was to
identify where there was a high level of data relevance. Once a positive correlation
between data could be determined, testing for factors which influence the existence of the
s-curve could begin.
Initial testing was conducted at a city level, comparing frequency and passenger
share. The data was simplified through the elimination of path quality factors by
focusing on routes with no nonstop service. Table 1 indicates the progression of the
testing for the s-curve at the city level. Testing all of the markets resulted in a very poor
relevance between data (Table 1, Trial 1). Table 1, Trial 2, dealt with the elimination of
very small markets and their high sampling errors; however, it also resulted in a bad fit of
data. Table 1, Trial 3, dealt with limiting the size of the market even further, with the
result that market thresholds do not improve the data relevance.

Table 1, Trial 4,

eliminates Southwest Airlines under the theory that this carrier caters to passengers that
are fare hunters and are not service driven. This did not improve the data relevance.
Table 1, Trail 5, tried to identify whether or not there was something unique about being
the top carrier in the market. The results of this analysis were not good. Table 1, Trail 6,
tests a large carrier with many markets. By focusing on one airline, the theory was that
data noise due to differences in marketing strategies was eliminated. Limiting the data
field worsened the results. Table 1, Trial 7, combined the theories behind Trials 5 and 6
by focusing on an airline where it was number one in the market. The data results were
even less relevant. Table 1, Trial 8, sought to answer the question of whether path
quality was integral to the process of understanding the s-curve. While the results were
20
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slightly more promising, with an R of .64, the multi-variant regression required to
continue testing was outside the scope of this project.
In Step 2 of Table 1, experimentation with different types of data-weighting was
tried to assist with the correlation. Weighting was introduced to account for differences
in city size. Weighting of the cities gave small cities less total value. The results for citybased data weighting improved slightly. In Table 1, Trials 14 and 15, markets were
eliminated with a theoretical or actual share of the market at less than 20% and greater
than 80%. This was done in an effort to eliminate outlying data and improve data
correlation. This effort failed and it was then understood that most of the data being
evaluated was in markets with less than a 20% share. By eliminating this segment of the
market, most of the testable data was eliminated and the data relevance diminished.

The

conclusion from Table 1 was that there is no pattern identifying an s-curve on a passenger
origin and destination basis at the city level.

Table 1
Frequency Versus Passenger Share for Origins and Destinations with No Nonstops

Variable

R^

Slope

Intercept

1. All carriers, all markets

.498

.87

2. Carriers with >50 pax per

.538

.80

.510

.80

.470

.72

5. Top Carrier in each market

.394

~

6. American Airlines, all markets

.360

.68

7. American Airlines where

.260

.48

.640

.90

.56

~

.54

.97

.04

.536

.91

.007

.533

.93

.087

Stepl

market
3. Carriers with > 20 pax per
market
4. All carriers without Southwest
Airlines

leading in market share
8. Quality Service Index (QSI)a
versus connection share
Step 2
9. All carriers, all markets incl.
props, weighted by size
10. All carriers, all markets,
weighted by size
11. All carriers, all markets,
weighted by pax
12. All carriers, all markets
weighted by pax, market, and

F

airline presence
13. All carriers, all markets, no

.517

.92

.007

14. Theoretical 20/80b, no weights

.340

.90

.015

15. Actual 20/80c, no weights

.251

.51

.228

weights

Note. Dashes indicate the field was not estimated. Step 1 data includes jet and propeller driven
aircraft. Step 2 data contains no propeller driven aircraft and is weighted (where indicated) by
data point size at the rate of lx the size of the sample. For example, a market with 1000
passengers counted 10 times as much as a market with 100 passengers. From Form 41, 3rd
Quarter 1995, Origin and Destinations (O&D) with connections.
a

See Appendix A.

b

Elimination of markets with a share less than 20% and greater than 80% of

overall data totals. Elimination of markets with a share less than 20% and greater than 80% by
O&D.
In Table 2, combinations of service and passenger share at hub cities were
compared to determine if there was a correlation between data. If the fit was good, that
would indicate that the s-curve exists at the hub level. To accomplish this testing, data
was collected by airline, by route, and summed to a hub basis. For example, American
Airlines flights from Dallas to Albuquerque, Dallas to Denver, and Dallas to Seattle were
summed and used as one Dallas data point. The tests performed in Table 2 show that the
relevance of the data was good no matter the form of the model tested. The conclusion
from Table 2 was that the data relevance is much improved on a hub basis versus a
passenger origin and destination basis.

Table 2
Service Share Versus Passenger Share Combinations by Hub City

Variable
16. Pax share vs. dept. share,

R^

Slope

Intercept

F

.910

1.05

-.0038

344,160*

.920

0.00

.98

.904

1.03

-.003

.977

1.004

-.0008

.992

1.01

-.0012

4,021,576*

.938

.954

.0034

516,585*

.796

1.01

-.0011

132,288*

.920

1.01

-.0008

388,201*

.997

1.02

-.0013

12,558,676*

weighted by total seats3
17. Pax share vs. dept. share,
weighted by departures
18. Pax share vs. dept. share,
weighted by dept. in Seattleb
19. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats
20. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats3
21. Pax share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs
22. RPM share vs. dept. share,
weighted by total seats
23. RPM share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats
24. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs
Note. Dashes indicate the field was not estimated. Hub cities include ATL, CLT, CVG, DAL,
DEN, DFW, DTW, EWR, IAD, IAH, JFK, LAS, LAX, MSP, ORD, PHL, PHX, PIT, SEA, SFO,
SLC, STL. All data is weighted by data point size at the rate of lx the size of the sample. For
example, a market with 1000 passengers counted 10 times as much as a market with 100
passengers. From TlOO Domestic Segments, Year 1995 and 1996, by airline, by route, summed
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to the origin level with hub cities only. Elimination of carriers with 0, 1, or 100 observations.
b

Arbitrary city choice to test city phenomenon.

* p < .0001
The testing conducted for Table 3, Step 1, was to identify whether or not
passenger share is disproportionately larger in cities with greater capacity share. Testing
data on a city basis resulted in a good data relevance. Trial 30 (Table 3, Step 1),
compared total RPM share versus ASM share, weighting total ASMs. Trial 26 (Table 3,
Step 1), compared passenger share and seat share, weighting total seats. The results from
both of these tests showed a strong correlation between the data and a slope greater than
1; indicating the potential for the s-curve to exist. Having achieved a high level of data
relevance for these two tests, the next step was to identify whether or not the relationships
were different at different share levels. In Table 3, Steps 2 and 3, continued refinement
of RPM share versus ASM share was conducted to identify the s-curve more finely. The
results of Table 3, Step 2, identify an S-curve. The R2s are good and the slopes are
greater than 1 in many instances. The poor results in Step 3 suggest that a 10 zone
evaluation of the data cuts the data too narrowly, resulting in poor dispersion and the
inability for the model to fit a good slope line and, consequently, results in a poor R2.

Table 3
Service Share Versus Passenger Share Combinations for All Cities

Variable

R^

Slope

Intercept

F

.777

.94

.0099

118,316*

.960

1.01

-.0009

805,212*

.853

.95

.0091

195,977*

.604

.83

.0279

51,665*

.832

.93

.0105

167,499*

.978

1.01

-.0015

1,529,054*

.985

1.01

-.0008

1,680,903*

.911

1.01

-.0052

47,318*

.841

1.07

-.0265

12,653*

Stepl
25. Pax share vs. dept. share,
weighted by total seats
26. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats
27. Pax share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs
28. RPM share vs. dept. share,
weighted by total seats
29. RPM share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats
30. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs
Step 2
31. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs:
0-20% ASM share
32. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs:
21-40% ASM share
33. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs:
41-60% ASM share

34. RPM share vs. ASM share,

.914

.97

.0402

13,

.970

.93

.0721

23,384*

.905

1.00

-.0008

185,892*

.506

1.03

-.0043

5387*

.314

.96

.0059

1314*

.247

1.07

-.0296

575*

.208

1.03

-.0112

355*

.208

1.08

-.0347

274*

.214

1.15

-.0792

216*

weighted by total ASMs:
61-80% ASM share
35. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs:
81-100% ASM share
Step 3
36. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs;
0-10% ASM share
37. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs;
11-20% ASM share
38. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs;
21-30% ASM share
39. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs;
31-40% ASM share
40. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs;
41-50% ASM share
41. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs;
51-60% ASM share
42. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs;

61-70% ASM share
43. RPM share vs. ASM share,

.086

.77

.1802

47*

.132

.84

.1320

61*

.448

.95

.0466

267*

weighted by total ASMs;
71-80% ASM share
44. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs;
81-90% ASM share
45. RPM share vs. ASM share,
weighted by total ASMs;
91-100% ASM share
Note. All data is weighted by data point size at the rate of lx the size of the sample. For
example, a market with 1000 passengers counted 10 times as much as a market with 100
passengers. From TlOO Domestic Segments, Year 1995 and 1996, by airline, by route, summed
to the origin level with all cities.
* /X.0001
Table 4 shows the further refinement of the s-curve data regarding passenger
share versus seat share. These trials measured spent capacity and produced capacity;
meaning that it measured the seat share allocated by a carrier against that carrier's
resulting passenger share. Again, the poor results in Table 4, Step 2, suggest that a 10
zone evaluation of the data cuts the data too narrowly, resulting in poor dispersion and
the inability for the model to fit a good slope line and, consequently, results in a poor R2.
A comparison of Table 3, Step 1, and Table 4 shows that the s-curve was more
robust when determined by seats rather than departures. This indicates that a marginal
investment in seats results in more passengers. Airlines may be more focused on having
the right size aircraft, conceding the right number of departures to the perceived
competitive environment. There is a need for further research to investigate this
phenomenon with the use of QSI and airline image measures.

Table 4
Spent Capacity Versus Produced Capacity in All Cities

Variable

R^

Slope

Intercept

F

.956

1.01

-.0005

536,279*

.697

.90

.0210

10,624*

.770

1.13

-.0535

7937*

.778

.93

.0693

4945*

.915

.95

.0595

6521*

.942

1.02

-.0008

326,756*

.614

1.01

-.0024

7775*

Step 1
46. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats:
0-20%) seat share
47. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats:
21-40% seat share
48. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats:
41-60% seat share
49. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats:
61-80% seat share
50. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats:
81-100% seat share
Step 2
51. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats:
0-10% seat share
52. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats:
11-20%) seat share

53. Pax share vs. seat share,

.397

.84

.0371

1663*

.340

1.04

-.0260

1073*

.442

1.20

-.0851

911*

.508

1.29

-.1424

1157*

.365

.88

.1013

509*

.547

.79

.1720

633*

.787

.98

.0292

998*

weighted by total seats:
21-30% seat share
54. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats:
31-40% seat share
55. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats:
41-50% seat share
56. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats:
51-60% seat share
57. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats:
61-70% seat share
58. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats:
71-80% seat share
59. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats:
81-90% seat share
60. Pax share vs. seat share,
weighted by total seats:
91-100% seat share
Note. Dashes indicate the field was not estimated. All data is weighted by data point size at the
rate of lx the size of the sample. For example, a market with 1000 passengers counted 10 times

as much as a market with 100 passengers. From TlOO Domestic Segments, Year 1995 and 1996,
by airline, by route, summed to the origin level with all cities.
* p<.000\
Tables 5 and 6 sought to identify the existence of the s-curve by carrier strength in
the market. This would indicate whether or not being the strongest carrier in a market
provided an advantage with the s-curve. Table 4 results showed strong data relevance
and s-curve indicators without city weighting, therefore, testing for Tables 5 and 6 was
completed without this weighting.

The R2s fall as the zone share gets higher because

there was less data, resulting in increased randomness.
A comparison of the results from Tables 5 and 6 indicated that the stronger an
airline was in a market, the greater its ability to benefit from the s-curve. When the data
was examined by carrier ranking, RPM versus ASM received much more robust results
than passenger share versus seat share. This may be due to airlines being much more
careful with the allocation of ASMs than the allocation of seats. When confronted with a
fleeting decision, a carrier would be much more careful allocating the correct sized
aircraft on the Chicago to Kona route and less careful with the Chicago to Seattle route.

Table 5
Passenger Share Versus Seat Share for All Cities by Carrier

Variable

R^

Slope

Intercept

F

.212

.92

.0477

22*

.401

.94

.0412

1037*

.382

.94

.0675

1135*

Stepl
61. Pax share vs. seat share,
Carrier #1: 0-20% seat share
62. Pax share vs. seat share,
Carrier # 1: 21-40% seat share
63. Pax share vs. seat share,
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Carrier #1:41 -60% seat share
64. Pax share vs. seat share,

.329

.94

.0657

671*

.605

.85

.1329

928*

.744

1.01

.0116

6748*

.327

.710

.0662

1237*

.073

.41

.1976

42*

.134

-.69

.8718

6**

.775

.91

.0106

12,266*

.020

.17

.1410

9***

1.0

-.91

.594

Carrier # 1: 61-80% seat share
65. Pax share vs. seat share,
Carrier #1: 81-100% seat share
Step 2
66. Pax share vs. seat share,
Carrier #2: 0-20% seat share
67. Pax share vs. seat share,
Carrier #2: 21-40% seat share
68. Pax share vs. seat share,
Carrier #2: 41-60% seat share
69. Pax share vs. seat share,
Carrier #2: 61-80% seat share
70. Pax share vs. seat share,
Carrier #2: 81-100% seat share
Step 3
71. Pax share vs. seat share,
Carrier #3: 0-20% seat share
72. Pax share vs. seat share,
Carrier #3: 21-40% seat share
73. Pax share vs. seat share,
Carrier #3: 41-60% seat share
74. Pax share vs. seat share,
Carrier #3: 61-80%) seat share
75. Pax share vs. seat share,
Carrier #3: 81-100% seat share

Note. Dashes indicate the field was not estimated. From TlOO Domestic Segments, Year 1995
and 1996, by airline, by route, summed to the origin level with all cities.
* /?<.0001, **p<.0157,

***p<.0026

Table 6
Service Share Versus Passenger Share for All Cities by Carrier

Variable

Rf

Slope

Intercept

F

.952

1.17

-.0123

1618*

.914

1.06

-.0070

16,532*

.912

1.08

-.0171

19,052*

.896

1.05

-.0208

11,817*

.736

1.15

.1483

1685*

.875

1.09

-.0016

16,172*

.908

1.02

-.0153

25,180*

.835

1.05

-.0650

2686*

Stepl
76. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #1: 0-20% ASM share
77. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #1: 21-40% ASM share
78. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #1: 41-60% ASM share
79. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #1: 61-80% ASM share
80. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #1:81-100% ASM
share
Step 2
81. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #2: 0-20% ASM share
82. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #2: 21-40% ASM share
83. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #2: 41-60% ASM share

84. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #2: 61-80% ASM share
85. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #2: 81-100% ASM
share
Step 3
86. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #3: 0-20% ASM share
87. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #3: 21-40% ASM share
88. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #3: 41-60% ASM share
89. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #3: 61-80% ASM share
90. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #3: 81-100% ASM
share
Step 4
91. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #4: 0-20% ASM share
92. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #4: 21-40% ASM share
93. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #4: 41-60% ASM share
94. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #4: 61-80% ASM share
95. RPM share vs. ASM share,

Carrier #4: 81-100% ASM
share
Step 5
96. RPM share vs. ASM share,

.922

.97

.0010

31,158*

.752

.37

.1541

15*

Carrier #5: 0-20% ASM share
97. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #5: 21-40% ASM
share
98. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #5: 41-60% ASM share
99. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #5: 61-80% ASM share
100. RPM share vs. ASM share,
Carrier #5: 81-100% ASM
share
Note. Dashes indicate the field was not estimated. From TlOO Domestic Segments, Year 1995
and 1996, by airline, by route, summed to the origin level with all cities.
* »<.0001

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS
The s-curve exists for dominant carriers in a market and can be most effectively
analyzed with RPM share versus ASM share at the city level, summed to the origin.
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Figure 2. RPM Share versus ASM Share for all Carriers and all Cities, Summed to the
Origin.

The data indicates that if you are the number 1 carrier in a city, you will get a
positive marginal value for an investment in capacity.
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Figure 3. RPM Share versus ASM Share for the #1 Carrier in all Cities, Summed to the
Origin.

The number 2 carrier in a city also has some potential for receiving a positive
marginal value for investment in capacity. Especially if they own nearly 30% of the
capacity share.
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Figure 4. RPM Share versus ASM Share for the #2 Carrier in all Cities, Summed to the
Origin.

Beginning with the third carrier in a city, carriers generally do not receive a fair
share of revenue passengers for the capacity they offer to the market.
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Figure 5. RPM Share versus ASM Share for the #3 Carrier in all Cities, Summed to the
Origin.
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Figure 6. RPM Share versus ASM Share for the #4 Carrier in all Cities, Summed to the
Origin.
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Figure 7. RPM Share versus ASM Share for the #5 Carrier in all Cities, Summed to the
Origin.

ASM was most likely a better measure of capacity because airlines are more
careful with ASMs than with seats. This means that when faced with a fleeting decision,
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an airline would usually take greater care flying the correct size aircraft on Chicago to
Kona than it would on Chicago to Detroit.
While the most robust results could be found through an analysis of RPM share
versus ASM share, passenger share versus seat share also showed positive results. The
results of the passenger share versus seat share testing indicated that by adding more seats
to the market, you would obtain a greater share of passengers. It does not appear that
adding more departures has the same effect. This is contrary to the assumptions of most
air carriers.
The s-curve could not be identified at a passenger origin and destination level.
The data relevance improved significantly when analyzed at the hub level and the city
level, summed to the origin.
In conclusion, the s-curve does exist. The s-curve is a city phenomenon and
rankings for service levels have a significant impact on its affect on passenger/revenue
share.

CHAPTER V
RECOMMENDATIONS

This author recommends continued evaluation of the s-curve phenomenon
through a multi-variant regression analysis, including the use of QSI characteristics.
Applying actual revenue data against the service share offered in a market would be an
interesting comparative analysis for the s-curve. As the market continues to evolve with
the emergence of alliance networks, it would also be of considerable interest to test the
effects of the s-curve and the effectiveness of joint carriers to gain more than their fair
share of the market. Finally, the ability to forecast the effects of carriers owning faster
than current aircraft would be an interesting new test for the s-curve.
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
QSI COEFFICIENTS

Types of Service

Coefficient

Nonstop

1.0000

One-stop ("Good")

0.4500

Two-stop

0.1500

Single connection ("Good")

0.1500

Double connection

0.0250

Triple connection

0.00416666

Nonstop/through

0.0500

Connection/through

0.0017

Double connection/through

0.00002833

Commuter nonstop

0.2500

"Good" connection to commuter

0.0375

"Bad" one-stop

0.189

"Bad" connection

0.063

"Bad" connection to commuter

0.016

"Good" = service with elapsed time within 75 minutes of shortest elapsed time in market.
"Bad" = elapsed time more than 75 minutes longer than shortest elapsed time in market.

